Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

In imperfect-information games, the optimal strategy in a subgame may depend on the strategy in other, unreached subgames.

As a result, depth-limited search algorithms used in single-agent settings and perfect-information games do not apply.

In adversarial team games, a team of players sequentially faces a team of adversaries.

In imperfect-information games, the optimal strategy in a subgame may depend on the strategy in other, unreached subgames. Thus a subgame cannot be solved in isolation and must instead consider the strategy for the entire game as a whole, unlike perfect-information games. Nevertheless, it is possible to first approximate a solution for the whole game and then improve it in individual subgames. This is referred to as subgame solving. We introduce subgame-solving techniques that outperform prior methods both in theory and practice. We also show how to adapt them, and past subgame-solving techniques, to respond to opponent actions that are outside the original action abstraction; this significantly outperforms the prior state-of-the-art approach, action translation. Finally, we show that subgame solving can be repeated as the game progresses down the game tree, leading to far lower exploitability. These techniques were a key component of Libratus, the first AI to defeat top humans in heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em poker.

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and wildlife poaching prevention. Even though many of these settings are sequential in nature, existing techniques pre-compute the entire solution ahead of time. In this paper, we present a theoretically sound and empirically effective way to apply search, which leverages extra online computation to improve a solution, to the computation of Stackelberg equilibria in general-sum games. Instead of the leader attempting to solve the full game upfront, an approximate "blueprint" solution is first computed offline and is then improved online for the particular subgames encountered in actual play. We prove that our search technique is guaranteed to perform no worse than the pre-computed blueprint strategy, and empirically demonstrate that it enables approximately solving significantly larger games compared to purely offline methods. We also show that our search operation may be cast as a smaller Stackelberg problem, making our method complementary to existing algorithms based on strategy generation.

Tuomas Sandholm, a computer scientist at Carnegie Mellon University, is not a poker player--or much of a poker fan, in fact--but he is fascinated by the game for much the same reason as the great game theorist John von Neumann before him. Von Neumann, who died in 1957, viewed poker as the perfect model for human decision making, for finding the balance between skill and chance that accompanies our every choice. He saw poker as the ultimate strategic challenge, combining as it does not just the mathematical elements of a game like chess but the uniquely human, psychological angles that are more difficult to model precisely--a view shared years later by Sandholm in his research with artificial intelligence. "Poker is the main benchmark and challenge program for games of imperfect information," Sandholm told me on a warm spring afternoon in 2018, when we met in his offices in Pittsburgh. The game, it turns out, has become the gold standard for developing artificial intelligence.